09:30-10:00 Setting up the exhibitor booths
10:00-10:30 Short intro by each exhibitor (3min. each)
10:30-12:00 Demo session
Douglas Wikström (Verificatum AB, KTH Royal Institute of Technology)
Verificatum - A Swiss Army Knife of Electronic Voting Software
Abstract: The Verificatum Mix-Net (VMN) is acknowledged as the world leading mix-net in terms of security, flexibility, documentation, speed, and quality as well as maturity of code.
VMN is completely faithful to cryptographic theory and the only mix-net we are aware of that is implemented entirely by senior
cryptographers that regularly publishes at top tier conferences in cryptography, and
key algorithms of the implementation have been discovered and published by these researchers at IACR conferences in cryptography.
It is the only implementation with a mature document that describes the universally verifiable proof of correctness. This document
has been used repeatedly by undergraduates to implement verifiers without access to the source code to verify this claim in practice.
VMN consists of only proven cryptographic technology. It was used in the Norwegian electronic elections 2013 and in the election
of the party leader of Meretz (party in the Israeli parliament) and several student union elections in cooperation with Tel Aviv University, and in several elections in Spain in cooperation with
Agora Voting SLL.
has the same qualities as VMN. Notably, the core library for big integers is faster than all publicly available aggressively optimized libraries. In contrast to the latter, our implementation is
properly structured with clean and documented code.
Verificatum provides all the application independent cryptographic software needed to implement the strongest and most secure
electronic voting system. The remaining components of an electronic voting system are inherently application and organization dependent.
We will demonstrate VMN interactively and illustrate how it can be a viewed as a blackbox that can solve all tallying schemes for
El Gamal based electronic voting systems that we are aware of by changing parameters.
We will also demonstrate VCL and show the code online to illustrate what we consider to be minimal quality requirements on
security critical software and why we consider this to be a game changer in terms of code quality for clients.
Jordi Puiggali, Sandra Guasch (Scytl)
Achieving Individual Verifiability in the Neuchâtel E-Voting System
Abstract: During the VoteID 2015 System Demo Session, Scytl will walk you through its secure online voting system that implements an end-to-end secure and verifiable cryptographic protocol ready to achieve the Swiss Federal Chancellery Internet voting requirements published in 2014. To this end, the voting system implements an individual verification system for voters, that allows them to check that their votes are accurately recorded by the voting system (cast-as-intended verification). This system and verification mechanism has been successfully used in Neuchatel Canton referendums since 2014. This is a similar individual verification mechanism than the successfully used in Norway during municipal (2011) and general elections (2013).
The voting system is also designed to provide universal verifiability and distribution of cryptographic operations through independent components (i.e., also known as control components), facilitating to achieve the highest level of security requirements from the Federal Chancellery and eliminating any restriction about the amount of voters that can use an Internet voting system in Switzerland.
From the accessibility point of view, it does not only allow remote voters to participate in the election process but it also implements an individual verification mechanism that is more usable and accessible than other systems (i.e., the verification process consists on just matching the code returned by the voting system with the candidate code present in his/her voting card). Scytl’s demo will allow participants to see and test this verification process.
Nicolas Arni-Bloch (République et Canton de Genève)
CHvote – The Geneva E-Voting System
Abstract: The State of Geneva is a pioneer actor in electronic voting system in Switzerland. In fact since 2003 the Geneva's system has been successfully used 39 times, for both referendums (35) and elections (4). After over 10 years of successful operations, the Geneva's system CHvote made its transformation in 2015, by implementing individual verifiability.
We would therefore be pleased to present the latest version of CHvote at your conference, through a demonstration platform for the elections.
CHVote today means:
The address and all the materials needed to test the system will be communicated during the demonstration session.
Stéphane Glondu (LORIA, Nancy)
Abstract: Belenios is an online voting system that provides confidentiality and verifi- ability. End-to-end verifiablity relies on the fact that the ballot box is public (voters can check that their ballots have been received) and on the fact that the tally is publicly verifiable (anyone can recount the votes). Confidentiality relies on the encryption of the votes and the distribution of the decryption key.
Belenios builds upon Helios, a voting protocol used in several elections. The main design enhancement of Belenios vs Helios is that the ballot box can no longer add (fake) ballots, due to the use of credentials that are used to sign ballots.
The system is intended for remote voting. It accomodates elections that can be tallied using homomorphic encryption.
Steve Schneider (University of Surrey, Coasca Ltd.)
SuVote - Victorian State Elections 2014
Abstract: The SuVote system is an end-to-end verifiable electronic voting system intended for use in supervised (attendance) voting settings. It is a centralised ballot box system, whereby votes are submitted to a distributed central ballot box. It can handle both plurality and preference based (e.g. STV) elections.
The system is designed to handle multiple constituencies running separate elections at the same time and provides print on demand ballot printing to allow election centres to handle all the different constituencies seamlessly.
The front-end is tablet based and was designed from the ground up to provide a range of accessibility interfaces. All instructions are multi-model including text, audio and where appropriate video animations. As well as providing a standard visual interface there is a gesture based audio interface and a telephone keypad style overlay – providing choice to the voter. The different interfaces can be preselected by a poll worker or overridden by the voter at any time. The tablets also provide read out functionality to allow any printed verification receipts to be read back to the user – this functionality is provided across all tablets, so a voter may use different tablets to cross-check for consistency.
The core of the system is based on Prêt à Voter and provides end-to-end verifiability. Voters receive a traditional looking Prêt à Voter receipt, complete with digital signature assuring them their vote has been successfully received and recorded by the distributed web bulletin board. Voters can check the consistency of the receipt via a mobile phone application and subsequently check the presence of their receipt on the web bulletin board and in the input to the mix-net (individual verifiability). Proofs of mixing and decryption are provided at the end of the election and all transaction data is made public (universal verifiability). Receipts are currently listed by serial number, but could be listed by voter name if an electoral commission agreed – thus provided eligibility verifiability.
Vote privacy is guaranteed when the standard polling place assumptions hold – namely that there is no monitoring in the polling booth and that the equipment used to vote does not leak voter actions. Additionally, all cryptography is threshold based and would therefore require a threshold of dishonest parties to collude in order to breach privacy. The system is designed to have distinct and mutually distrusting parties controlling individual key shares, web bulletin board peers and mix-net peers. Printed candidate lists (left hand sides in Prêt à Voter parlance) are only valid for a limited period of time (10 minutes) after which the printer of the left hand side deletes all information used to print it and the candidate list automatically becomes invalid. Once a left hand side has been used to start voting session it can no longer be audited, but there is no timeout enforced for completion. The data used to print the left hand side is always automatically deleted after the timeout, therefore even if a printing device is stolen or corrupted at a later date it will not contain any information about used ballots beyond the 10 minute timeout window.
The system was deployed as vVote in the Victorian State Election in November 2014. It was located in 25 polling centres for the 2 weeks of early voting, including the London based polling centre in Victoria House. Within the state of Victoria its use was restricted to disabled voters; in London it was open to all voters.
Eric Dubuis, Severin Hauser (Bern Univ. of Applied Sciences)
UniVote2 - Verifiable Student Board Elections in Switzerland
Abstract: UniVote2 is a verifiable Internet voting system for student board elections and referendums at Swiss universities. It supports complex elections with open party-lists and cumulation of candidates. From the voter's perspective, it is a web application that runs in the web browser. The user interface has been designed for making the vote casting process as simple as possible even for the most complex elections. To participate at UniVote elections, voters are required to go through a one-time registration process, in which the standard university login process is used for authentication. Currently, an affiliation to a Swiss university is therefore a prerequisite for using UniVote.
To provide verifiability, UniVote2 publishes all the election data on a public bulletin board. Upon registration, voters create an private Schnorr signature key, which they use for signing the encrypted votes. Prior the an election, the corresponding public keys are mixed in a mix network to allow anonymous vote casting. The encryption key is shared among multiple parties to protect the secrecy of the vote at all times. At the end of the voting period, the votes are jointly decrypted by the parties holding the shares of the decryption key. All computational steps are accompanied with corresponding non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs to demonstrate adherence to the protocol. Voters receive a signed receipt of their vote cast, which they can use for individual verification and in case of a complaint.
Since 2013, UniVote has been used for multiple elections at the University of Zürich, the University of Bern, the University of Lucerne, and the Bern University of applied Sciences. The accumulated size of the electorate is approximately 73'000. Most voters provided a positive feedback regarding the usability and the perceived security. Further elections with the new version UniVote2 are planned at the universities of Basel and Lucerne in October and November 2015.
Philipp Locher, Rolf Haenni (Bern Univ, of Applied Sciences)
UniCrypt - A Cryptographic Java Library for E-Voting Applications
Abstract: Various cryptographic libraries exist in different programming languages. Most of them are restricted to standard cryptography such as symmetric and asymmetric encryption, digital signatures, certificates, hash functions, or message authentication codes. They are great toolboxes for everyday purposes, but not for the implementation of complex cryptographic protocols. UniCrypt is a new cryptographic library for Java, which implements an extended set of advanced cryptographic primitives. The mathematical core of the library deals with various algebraic structures (semigroup, monoid, group, cyclic group, semiring, ring, field) and offers numerous concrete instantiations thereof. The cryptographic front-end of the library includes flexible and convenient APIs for encryption/decryption, commitments, secret sharing, zero-knowledge proofs, verifiable cryptographic mixing, and many more.